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Abstract: 
This thesis uses primary sources pertaining to the 1964 Presidential Campaign in Illinois 
to demonstrate the importance of experienced political operatives and suburban 
professionals in Barry Goldwater’s successful primary campaign. In order to argue this 
viewpoint, this thesis first explores the creation of the Draft Goldwater movement. 
Following that, the major supporters of the Goldwater Campaign in Illinois are profiled 
and compared to previous unsuccessful conservative campaigns. The legacy of these 
suburban operatives is then chronicled in multiple tiers of government in the decades 
following the 1964 campaign to illustrate the long-term impact of their ideals. 
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Introduction:  
All eyes were on Senator Barry Goldwater at the 1964 Republican National 
Convention in Daly City, California when he defiantly remarked “I would remind you 
that extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice! And let me remind you also that 
moderation in the pursuit of justice is no virtue!”1 This quote became a rallying cry for a 
Presidential campaign that unexpectedly captured the Republican Presidential nomination 
and redefined American politics in the process. Although many popular media narratives 
of the Goldwater Campaign often dismissed his candidacy due to his eventual landslide 
loss to President Lyndon Johnson, academic research into the election has found a larger 
legacy of the campaign. Historians Lisa McGirr and Kim Phillips-Fein challenge the idea 
that Goldwater’s candidacy was simply a fluke in the history of Presidential politics. 
Various conservative leaders across the late twentieth century credit the Goldwater 
campaign for giving them ideological grounding and for shifting the entire Republican 
party to more conservative values. Although many popular media accounts have framed 
the campaign as being a purely grassroots endeavor, recent research suggests that the 
campaign’s success was built upon experienced political operatives. This thesis will 
argue that the watershed moment that made the Goldwater campaign successful was the 
conversion of mid-level Republican party insiders to conservative ideology. Using a local 
case study of state-level politics, I argue that the campaign’s success in the Illinois 
primary relied on politically experienced upper middle-class campaign workers in the 
suburbs. I will then go on to show the lasting impact from this suburban dominance of the 
campaign was felt at many levels of government ranging from local to federal. Based on 
 
1 Lee Edwards, Goldwater The Man Who Made a Revolution (Washington: Regnery Publishing, 
1995), 15. 
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extensive research in the Goldwater collection in Arizona as well as political coverage in 
fourteen newspapers, this thesis shows that the Goldwater campaign relied on covert 
networks of experienced conservatives and suburban operatives to build a campaign that 
influenced local and federal politics for the next fifty years.  
This work contributes to an ongoing conversation among scholars on the origins 
of a new conservative politics. research into this subject is rich and filled with many 
authors who have differing perspectives. Two noteworthy academic sources in particular 
give context to the current research pertaining to changes in the conservative movement 
in the 1964 Presidential Election: Suburban Warriors by Lisa McGirr and Invisible 
Hands by Kim Philips-Fein. Suburban Warriors by Lisa McGirr views the origins of the 
Goldwater campaign through the perspective of conservatives in suburban Orange 
County. McGirr argues that the failures of conservatives in the previous decades 
prompted a backlash among these grassroots activists that reshaped the Republican party 
and gave Barry Goldwater the Republican Presidential nomination. She uses local issues, 
like the fear of communists infiltrating the public schools, as the driving mechanisms that 
mobilized local conservatives through already existing institutions like church groups and 
the PTA.2 McGirr summarizes her scholarship by saying “In short, then, this book 
explores the right as a social movement, distinguishing the distinct but intersecting levels 
at which right-wing mobilization occurred.”3 This book provides a valuable argument 
that the transformation of American conservatives began from the ground-up in the early 
1960s. My work has some similarities with the arguments that McGirr makes. Much like 
 
2 Lisa McGirr, Suburban Warriors. (Princeton University Press, 2002), 54. 
3 Ibid., 12. 
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McGirr, I also emphasize the importance of suburban activists and women in the process 
of Goldwater’s campaign and the ultimate changes on the Republican Party.  
 Invisible Hands by Kim Philips-Fein offers a differing perspective. Philips-Fein 
argues that the conservative movement found in the 1960s and beyond started with 
various elite libertarian groups that arose to combat the New Deal. Philips-Fein states that 
it was large scale political issues that drove the creation of the modern conservative 
movement over time. Philips-Fein specifically states that this movement was created 
quietly by businessmen such as W.C. Mullendore and the du Pont brothers to fight unions 
and large government.4  She summarizes her argument by stating “If we shift focus from 
cultural to economic issues, it becomes clear that the origins of modern conservative 
politics and ideology predates the 1960s”5 This study stands in sharp contrast to the 
arguments provided in Suburban Warriors. Much like Phillips-Fein, I also highlight 
experienced high-level campaign operatives. Although I do not attribute the changes 
explored in this thesis to peak level elites, I do explore the importance of agenda driven 
party insiders who had a long history of political engagement. My argument in this thesis 
falls somewhere between the arguments made by McGirr and Phillips-Fein. I argue that 
conservative activists were important in the creation of the Goldwater campaign in 1964, 
but previous history shows that these activists could not do that without the help of 
Republican Party insiders who also backed Goldwater. This thesis is an exploration of the 
suburban insiders, rather than the grassroots organizers.  
 
4 Kim Phillips-Fein, Invisible Hands: the Businessmans Crusade against the New Deal. (New 
York, NY: Norton, 2010), 30-60.  
5 Ibid., p.xii. 
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 At moments of conservative resurgence there has been a popular appetite for 
books about Goldwater. Various accounts of the Goldwater campaign have been 
published in the last 30 years that have also recognized the importance of conservatives 
in the 1964 election. Goldwater: The Man Who Made the Revolution, written by Lee 
Edwards in 1994, focuses on how the Republican Party changed following the 1964 
election as well as being a biography on Goldwater himself. Edwards is a conservative 
activist who was involved in the Heritage Foundation and other political organizations. 
Edwards claims that Goldwater founded the modern conservative political movement. 
Another account of the campaign is Before the Storm by Rick Pearlstein. Pearlstein’s 
main purpose for writing this book is to challenge the popular media notion that the 
Goldwater Campaign was irrelevant. Pearlstein issues the challenge that Barry Goldwater 
was just as much an essential part of 1960s politics as President Johnson or Martin Luther 
King Junior.6 Pearlstein relies on a variety of sources to show evidence for this, but he 
leans new media and interviews from the time to gauge public perception of the 
campaign.7 It is important to note that both Goldwater: The Man Who Made the 
Revolution and Before the Storm were both written just before the large conservative 
electoral victories in 1994 and 2010 respectively. This provides context into each of the 
author’s inspirations in attempting to create an account for origins of the conservative 
movement.  
 
 
6 Rick Perlstein, Before the Storm: Barry Goldwater and the Unmaking of the American 
Consensus (New York, NY: Nation Books, 2009),15-30. 
7 Ibid., 35. 
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 This thesis is divided into three chapters. In Chapter 1, I will first explore the 
history of the Draft Goldwater organization. This chapter will chronicle the careers of 
Draft Goldwater founders Clif White, John Ashbrook, and Bill Rusher prior to the 1964 
campaign. The first chapter illustrates the means by which this group was able to create 
their conservative network and persuade Barry Goldwater to run for the Presidency. In 
Chapter 2, I will focus the early primary contests of New Hampshire and Illinois. I will 
contrast the differences between these two primary campaigns to illustrate the importance 
of state party insiders and suburban activists in Illinois primary. I will then explore the 
backgrounds of various suburban Goldwater delegates to illustrate the depth of their 
experience and their motivations for supporting the Goldwater campaign. In Chapter 3, I 
will explore the lasting influence of the suburban Goldwater campaign from three 
different perspectives. The first part of this chapter will focus on the changes in local 
politics that were carried out by politicians Lucinda Wanner and Lucinda Kasperson, 
activist politicians who were inspired by the campaign. I will then move on to examine 
the career of William Rentschler. Rentschler was a former Goldwater delegate who 
leaned on inspiration from Goldwater to fight the established Republican party from a 
centrist position for the next four decades after the campaign. Finally, this chapter will 
examine the career of Representative Phil Crane, who was a conservative leader from a 
western suburban congressional district. Although Crane mischaracterized himself as an 
outsider in politics, I will argue that he had wide-ranging campaign experience that he 
leveraged to push the Republican party to more conservative positions throughout his 
career.  
 
 11 
 
In order to build this perspective, I draw on many sources. The accounts of the 
campaign by Pearlstein and Edwards provide valuable details and narratives that I draw 
on to create context for my arguments.  Additionally, I travelled to Tempe, Arizona to 
draw on primary documents from the Illinois Goldwater campaign found at the Personal 
and Political Papers Paper of Senator Barry M. Goldwater collection at Arizona State 
University. This collection featured many valuable resources including personal 
correspondence, delegate vetting documents, and internal campaign files. Additionally, 
this collection also included an oral history document that records an interview done with 
F. Clifton White, one of the chief organizers of Draft Goldwater. This oral history 
account has only been used extensively by one other author, Kim Phillips-Fein. I draw on 
various books that are first-hand accounts of the campaign, such as those by Theodore 
White and Bill Rusher. I also did extensive research into news coverage on this topic, and 
I draw upon over a dozen newspapers to support my arguments.  
 The study of the Goldwater candidacy provides valuable insight into how 
conservative resurgences can happen. This campaign changed the course of the 
Republican Party and altered the American political spectrum. Academic research into 
the campaign has done much to explore how and why this change happened. This thesis 
contributes the existing pool of knowledge by being the most extensive source to 
document the Goldwater campaign in Illinois thus far published, and by investigating the 
changes implemented by the suburban members of that campaign. This thesis also 
contributes to the body of existing research by exploring careers of the operatives who 
started the campaign and explaining why they were successful. In short, this thesis 
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explores the careers of conservative insiders at varying levels of government to argue 
how the conservative change that defined the Republican Party after 1964 occurred. 
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Chapter 1: Launching a Campaign: Young Radicals, Secrecy and the Consolidation 
of a Conservative Network  
Firebrand leaders in grassroots movements often use the example of “smoke-filled 
rooms" populated by elites to illustrate their dissatisfaction with establishment politics. 
However, Barry Goldwater’s 1964 insurgent candidacy for the Presidency of the United 
States began in such a room. On October 8, 1961, a group of twenty-seven men met at the 
Avenue Motel in Chicago for a single purpose: to change the course of American 
politics.1 Among those in the room were J. Clifton White, John Ashbrook, and Bill 
Rusher.2 The men who filled this room were far from being novices to party politics. 
Their occupations included standard oil executives, National Young Republican officers, 
and even members of Congress. Their mission was to elevate a right-wing republican to 
the party's nomination for the Presidency of the United States. They would use their 
extensive knowledge of party politics to enact this mission. Most popular narratives of 
the Goldwater campaign illustrate the campaign as being started by grassroots outsiders 
who rashly took over the GOP. However, the sources documenting to the very origins of 
the campaign reveal that it was quite the opposite. Using various accounts of the Draft 
Goldwater movement, I will argue that campaign was formulated by Republican Party 
insiders that had the experience necessary to both convince Goldwater to get in the race 
and capture the GOP nomination for him. In order to support this argument, I will review 
the previous careers of the main organizers of Draft Goldwater movement. I will then 
move on to review the history of conflict within the Republican Party between 
 
 1 Rick Perlstein, Before the Storm: Barry Goldwater and the Unmaking of the American 
Consensus (New York : Nation Books, 2009), 300. 
 2 Ibid., 320. 
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conservatives and the so-called Eastern Establishment. I will chronicle conservative 
attempts to take control the party, including a short-lived attempt to win the nomination 
for Goldwater in 1960 and why they failed. Finally, I will Illustrate the importance of the 
experience that the organizers of Draft Goldwater had, and how the official Goldwater 
campaign came in to being. This shows that the typical popular media narrative of the 
Goldwater candidacy being born of fast-acting political novices is entirely untrue and 
unrealistic.   
 Three principal men organized this meeting in Chicago: J. Clifton White, John 
Ashbrook, and Bill Rusher. Even though these men not the elites of the Republican Party, 
they were still experienced. F. Clifton White had the experience necessary to create a 
conservative movement. After serving in World War II and teaching political science, 
Clif White entered the world of politics.3 He became involved in the Young Republican 
organization and county-level party organizing in New York state. This involvement 
culminated with White becoming national chairman of the Young Republicans in 1956.4 
As Clif White became more involved in party leadership, he began to realize that he 
could apply organizing tactics traditionally employed by unions for conservative causes.5 
His recognizable tall profile and colorful attire made him hard to miss at the organizing 
meetings and conventions that he faithfully led and attended. White was a dutiful 
operative of the party and worked on both the campaigns of Thomas Dewey and Dwight 
D. Eisenhower. Describing these earlier years, White stated that “I was at that juncture 
 
 3 Ibid., 12. 
 4 Ibid. 
 5 F. Clifton White, “The Goldwater Presidential Nomination: The Reminiscences of F. Clifton 
White,” Oral History Office, Columbia University (New York, NY: Columbia University, 1965), 12. The 
Personal and Political Paper of Barry M. Goldwater Series II "1964 Campaign," Box 119, Folder 29. 
Hayden Library, Arizona State University Archives, Tempe, Arizona, United States. 
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concerned with politics as technique. I had very little philosophical concern at the 
particular point… politics in of itself was enough.”6  
 
The Young Republican’s Revolt:  
Beginning in 1958, Clif White became more ideologically self-aware. He began 
to question what the impact of his political activity was, and this caused him to explore 
what his ideology was. White decided that both social and economic conservatism were 
the cornerstones of a prosperous country and that he needed to use his political acumen to 
advance these values.7 By 1960, he stated that he was disenchanted with the Eisenhower 
GOP platform, and found that he was not in agreement with the national leaders of the 
Republican Party. In the summer of 1961, White began to set his sights on larger goals 
than just working to win campaigns for the GOP. Clif White felt that it was no longer 
necessary to merely be a foot soldier for more liberal republicans with whom he 
disagreed. He reached out to two of his friends from the Young Republicans, Bill Rusher, 
and John Ashbrook, to ask them their opinions on the state of the party and how it could 
be won back for conservatives.8 The trio decided to meet for lunch at a small restaurant in 
New York in the summer of 1961 to discuss the state of the party. 
 William A. Rusher was born in Chicago but raised in New York City like Clif 
White. Rusher also served in World War II and practiced law after the war. Although 
raised in a moderate republican household, Bill Rusher would slowly begin to adopt an 
ideology of limited government as he continued his political involvement.9 He eventually 
 
 6 Ibid., 15. 
 7 Ibid., 12. 
 8 Ibid., 14.  
 9 Perlstein, 43.  
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joined the New York Young Republicans, which would bring him into contact with Clif 
White. As the two became more and more experienced, they gained much more attention 
from various other Republican leaders, both supportive and hostile to their cause. 
Attention from William F. Buckley would land Rusher a position at the National Review. 
At this influential conservative magazine, Rusher became a key leader who was just as 
influential in the messaging of the magazine as Buckley himself. Rusher and Buckley 
created a unified national voice for conservative intellectuals through the magazine. 
Attention to these articles from other Republicans, such as Nelson Rockefeller and his 
allies, who were hostile to his hardline conservative positions, would get Rusher removed 
from his leadership positions in the Young Republicans. However, this did not remove 
the political acumen he gained from his extensive work in party politics, nor did it take 
away his influence through the National Review. By 1961, he became fixated on the idea 
of taking back the Republican Party for conservatives. 
 John M. Ashbrook was also deeply involved in Republican politics by 1961. 
Ashbrook was elected as the United States Representative for Ohio’s 17th district in 
1960. Ashbrook was born and raised in Ohio. His father was a Republican newspaper 
editor and a former member of Congress. Even though Mr. Ashbrook came from a 
different region and background than White and Rusher, he shared their conservative 
beliefs. Ashbrook was also a prominent member of the Young Republicans organization. 
Although he joined the organization a little later than White and Rusher, the trio quickly 
became close friends. Ashbrook was especially interested in taking on the old liberal 
establishment of the Republican party. He explained to Rusher and White that he 
believed these moderate Republicans were influential but extraordinarily vulnerable and 
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unaware of how wide-reaching the conservative elements within the party were.10 
Ashbrook’s ties with other republicans in Congress would prove to be extremely valuable 
as the organizers looked for names to add to their list of potential dissenters to the 
moderate leaders of the Republican Party.11 
 The shared experiences of these men show that internal Republican organizations 
were becoming breeding grounds for a new generation of conservative operatives. The 
Young Republicans provided vital support for the party as a whole and were a training 
ground for operatives. The organization was so large that Rusher remarked to Ashbrook 
during the lunch  meeting that “if we held a meeting of our old YR crowd today, I’ll bet it 
would be about the third largest faction in the Republican party.”12 White, Ashbrook, and 
Rusher were not the only former members of the Young Republicans who developed 
became deeply in the Draft Goldwater movement. R. L. Herman and G. R. Herberger 
were both midwestern businessmen who became closely tied to GOP financial operations 
after their time in the Young Republicans. William R. Spear and Roger Milliken became 
state chairman of Nebraska and South Carolina, respectively, after being active in the 
Young Republicans. Their prior experience in the Young Republicans was not the only 
thing these men had in common. Each one of them had recently become a member of the 
conservative wing of the party and was on White’s invitation list for the meeting in 
Chicago.13 The Young Republicans seeded a new generation of conservative operatives 
who were much more experienced and capable than their predecessors.    
 
 10 White, 50. 
 11 White, 65. 
12 William A. Rusher, The Rise of the Right (New York: William Morrow and Co., 1984), 99. 
13 Lee Edwards, Goldwater The Man Who Made a Revolution (Washington: Regnery Publishing, 
1995), 170. 
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Conservative Dissent in the Republican Party Before 1961 
Despite their collective experience, the men who were present at the October 8, 
1961 meeting in Chicago were not recognized by the public as the Republican Party 
leaders. When many in the public named key figures of Republican Party Presidential 
politics in the early years of the 1960s, they likely would have first said former President 
Dwight D. Eisenhower, New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller, Vice President Richard 
Nixon, or even Pennsylvania Governor William Scranton. All of these men held 
prominent places in the public leadership of the Republican Party and were either 
previous GOP Nominees or presumed future nominees. President Eisenhower was still 
popular with the general public and used his influence to exert some of his preferences on 
the party.14 Meanwhile, his former Vice President, Richard Nixon, was freshly defeated 
in back to back elections for the Presidency and the Governorship of California but still 
retained his place in the public eye and planning a political comeback. Scranton and 
Rockefeller were not only both popular and influential in the states that they governed but 
kept latching on to higher roles in the GOP with the hopes that it would soon make them 
the front runner for the nomination. Governor Rockefeller, in particular, had come quite 
close to winning the nomination for himself at the 1960 GOP convention, in defiance of 
both Eisenhower and Nixon.15 However, these public leaders of the Republican Party had 
more in common than just their leadership positions and competitiveness. Conservatives 
viewed every one of these men as allies of the “Eastern Establishment.”16 
 
 14 Theodore H. White, The Making of the President 1964 (New York: Harper Perennial Political 
Classics, 1965), 72. 
 15 Ibid.  
16 Perlstein, 319. 
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  The term “Eastern Establishment” was a very general term used by conservative 
activists as a moniker to fight anyone liberal in the Republican Party. However, the term 
spread throughout the public due to some elements of truth about it. The Eastern 
Establishment did not just include Nixon, Scranton, and Rockefeller, but it also referred 
to the political and financial heavyweights who exerted their influence on the party. Some 
of the fundraising kingmakers of the GOP included George Champion of Chase 
Manhattan Bank, David Rockefeller, George S. Moore of First National City Bank, 
Harold Helm of Chemical Bank, and R.E. McNeill Jr. of Hanover trust.17 Although each 
of these men, save for Rockefeller, was originally from the south or Midwest of the 
country, they represented the epitome of east coast power and dominance in the GOP. 
These men, among other major donors and senior party leaders, had selected the winner 
of every Republican nominating convention for twenty years.18 Every GOP nominee 
since Wendell Wilke in 1940 had been the preferred candidate of this so-called Eastern 
Establishment. When a very conservative Midwesterner, Senator Bob Taft, looked likely 
to get the Republican nomination in 1952, it was these same powerbrokers that recruited 
Dwight D. Eisenhower to capture the nomination from him.19  
By 1964, many of the midwestern and southern members of the Republican Party 
felt ignored. Their voices were ignored at conventions, and their influence on the national 
Republican Party appeared to only be at a support level. Even the leading national 
presidential contender from the Midwest, Michigan governor George Romney, seemed to 
act like he was much closer with the Eastern Establishment than Midwestern 
 
 17 Theodore White, 72. 
 18 Ibid., 11.  
 19 Ibid., 324. 
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conservatives.20 However, it is essential to note that the divide in the Republican Party 
was not just a product of regional factionalism.  There was a sizeable ideological divide 
in the Republican Party by 1961. Wilkie and Dewey, two of the previous Republican 
presidential nominees, seemed to concede that it was necessary to keep some aspects of 
the New Deal. These concessions included approval of increased government and 
expansion of federal power over state power. These leaders became labeled as “Me Too 
Republicans” due to their tendency to follow the political lead of policy from the 
Democrats.21 Many conservative Republicans blamed these liberals within their party for 
their string of electoral defeats during the 1940s.  
In 1952, when Republicans finally did win White House back, it is was with 
Dwight D Eisenhower at the top of the ticket. Although they resented that Eisenhower 
"stole" the nominations from their favorite son, Bob Taft, many conservatives in the party 
gave him a chance due to his achievements and reputation. However, much to their 
dismay, Eisenhower took on polices that they thought made him just another Me Too 
Republican. His self-described “modern republicanism” attempted to occupy a middle 
ground between the Republican Party platform and popular New Deal policies.22 
Eisenhower refused to entertain ideas from Republicans in Congress about cutting back 
the Tennessee Valley Authority or Social Security. These positions frustrated many right-
wing members of the GOP.  
Conservative Republicans attempted to fight progressive policies and win back 
control of their party several times but found little success. The frustration of 
 
 20 Ibid., p. 326. 
 21 Ibid., p. 6. 
 22 Ibid., p. 43.  
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conservative Republicans would turn into fury as the Democrats took back control of 
Congress in 1954, and President Eisenhower compromised with them. The Federal 
Highway Act appeared to be another significant spending expenditure. Eisenhower 
pushed for a nuclear test ban treaty with the Soviet Union, and he sent in the National 
Guard to Little Rock to enforce the Civil Rights Act.23 These actions trampled on the 
ideals of limited government and firm foreign policy in the eyes of many conservatives. 
Conservatives would become even more infuriated as President Eisenhower nominated 
Earl Warren as Chief Justice of the United States, who consistently made rulings that 
gave the federal government more power.24 Each of these moves inspired conservative 
Republicans to channel grassroots efforts in order to challenge the party at conventions 
and in primary elections. In the decade before the 1960 election, not one liberal GOP 
incumbent lost a primary reelection to Congress, and the Eastern Establishment still 
controlled party conventions.25 However, this string of losses would not stop 
conservatives from launching another grassroots attempt to challenge the liberal members 
of their party at the convention during the summer of 1960.  
 The last minute and ultimately unsuccessful attempt to win the Republican 
nomination for Goldwater in 1960 created valuable lessons for organizers present at the 
1961 Chicago Meeting. Clarence Manion, a talk radio host, opened an Americans for 
Goldwater office three weeks before the 1960 Republican convention. Although Manion 
was a friend of Goldwater, the Senator was not directly involved in this movement.26 The 
 
 23 Ibid. 
 24 Perlstein, 30. 
25 Martis, Kenneth C., Ruth Anderson. Rowles and Gyula Pauer. The Historical Atlas of Political 
Parties in the United States Congress: 1789-1988. (New York, NY: Macmillan Pub., 1989). 
 26 Theodore White, 39. 
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summit between Rockefeller and Nixon inspired this small insurgency to take over the 
nominating process in 1960 before the nominating convention.  This summit set the party 
platform so that right-wing conservatives would be shut out of the policy discussions.27 
Goldwater pledged no official support to this movement but did give a rousing 
convention floor speech that stirred conservative delegates. Despite this surprise 
momentum, conservative activists who tried to compete at the convention were once 
again outsiders who did not know the rules or delegates to come close to winning. Party 
organizers were able to isolate Goldwater supporters and control the delegates to squash 
the convention rebellion before it even started.28 The Eastern Establishment was 
confident and proficient in their ability to put down these types of outsider insurgencies. 
However, they did not take into account that each of these failed insurgent conservative 
attempts were serving to inspire more experienced GOP operatives.   
The Secrets of Suite 3505: Recruiting Mid-Level Operatives 
The conversion of mid to high-level operatives into more conservative positions 
proved to be the watershed moment for change in the GOP. Midwestern party outsiders, 
such as Manion, were still firebrands combatting the party as they had been during the 
previous two decades. In the three years before the 1964 Presidential election, something 
entirely different was beginning to take shape. The early stages of the Draft Goldwater 
organization in 1961 bore little resemblance to the previous party takeover attempts by 
conservatives. This attempt to win the nomination for a conservative was led by 
experienced political professionals who became disillusioned with the GOP, instead of 
party outsiders. White, Rusher and Ashbrook knew they would have to learn from party 
 
 27 Perlstein, 145. 
 28  Ibid. 
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strategy that put down conservative revolts in the nominations of Richard Nixon and 
Dwight D. Eisenhower. It would turn out that these men knew liberal republican tactics 
quite well. After all, many of them learned these tactics when they worked for Nixon, 
Eisenhower, and Rockefeller themselves.29 They would have to strike early, fast, and they 
would need to do so quietly, unlike their predecessors.  
A carefully thought-out list of other experienced, conservative Republicans would 
be the first step in creating a successful campaign. White, Rusher and Ashbrook settled 
on twenty-six names of individuals that they thought were both conservative enough and 
discreet enough to help them lay the groundwork to accomplish this goal. The list 
included businessmen, veterans of the Young Republicans organization, and members of 
Congress. Every man on the invite list had the means necessary to enact a campaign of 
conservative conviction. White systematically categorized and vetted every person for the 
meeting. When White contacted each of these men, he only told them that "we're going to 
have a little meeting in Chicago to discuss some politics, I'd like to have you come in."30 
The men received no explanation, yet many of them felt the importance of the meeting. 
Discretion was important. If word got out that these men were going to a meeting to 
upend the party, they could very well lose their high-ranking party positions. One 
attendee, Frank Whetstone, even borrowed money in order to make the flight to Chicago. 
White, Rusher and Ashbrook turned an idea during lunches in New York into reality as 
these twenty-six men all approached Chicago to have a meeting with them, now they just 
had to complete the next steps. 
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The meeting took place at the Avenue Motel in Chicago. Clif White presided over 
the nearly four-hour-long meeting. The meeting organizers revealed the plan of retaking 
the GOP for conservatives to the attendees. Many become enthralled with the idea.31 
Enthusiasm was running high. White recalled that none of the participants even inquired 
about the score of the final World Series game taking place in New York at the same 
time.32 White was much more cautious. Although he was happy with the enthusiasm that 
he saw, he told the group to go back home and gauge whether or not such an operation 
was feasible. The group would meet again in two months to report back their findings.33 
 Although meeting attendees included men from all over the country, some did 
not have to travel very far to get home. Such was the case for Charlie Barr, who was an 
attendee from Chicago. Mr. Barr was an executive assistant and Standard Oil, and one of 
the most respected GOP operatives in the state.34 In the last decade, Barr had hosted 
fundraisers and rallies for Nixon, Eisenhower, and other more liberal Republicans. 
However, by 1961 he also felt alienated by the state of the republican party.35 Other 
observers in the meeting noted that Barr seemed rather quiet. However, he quickly used 
the resources at his disposal to secure funding for their effort. Barr also maintained a 
close relationship with Senator Everett Dirksen, who was a prominent conservative and 
the incumbent Senate Minority Leader. Senator Dirksen had first convinced Goldwater to 
run for the Senate in 1952. As the movement became public, he would also be 
instrumental in helping him decide to run for president. However, at this stage, his 
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associate Mr. Barr was one of only a handful of men that knew the storm that was coming 
in the Republican Party.36 Although White believed that they should not officially have a 
candidate until they knew their team, all of the men at the meeting in Chicago had 
someone in mind: the very same man that Manion and his associates tried to lead the 
charge against the Eastern Establishment in the previous election.37 
 
The Preferred Candidate: Goldwater’s Conservative Credentials  
 Barry Goldwater’s background played on the ideals of rugged individualism, and 
it further deepened the contrast between him and members of the eastern establishment.38  
Goldwater was born in Phoenix on January 2, 1909. His family founded Goldwater’s 
department store chain, which had been a retail juggernaut in Arizona for decades. 
Goldwater grew up in a business-centered household, and it would shape his views on the 
private sector during his formative years. Goldwater found escapes from helping with his 
family’s business, such as ham radio operation and rural photography. Goldwater’s love 
for photography would take him on many adventures through the Navajo and Hopi 
Nations. Barry Goldwater became close with many members of these Native American 
tribes on these trips in northern Arizona. These friendships would evolve into fierce 
advocacy and support of Native American rights in Arizona. However, Barry 
Goldwater’s business career and hobbies got put on hold as the country entered World 
War II and served as a pitot. After the war, he stayed in the air force reserve and 
continued to pursue flying both on and off duty.39  
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In 1949, Goldwater ran for the city council in Phoenix to clean up corruption in 
the city. After he won the seat on the city council, he took on this mission 
wholeheartedly. During his tenure, he fought for better gambling regulation and started 
investigations into corruption within the city. His reputation as a crusader against 
corruption would make him famous throughout the state, paving his way to a successful 
Senate bid in 1952.40 Everything from Barry Goldwater’s military career to his rural 
photography seemed to encompass the glorification of western ruggedness.    
 Barry Goldwater’s career in the Senate would prove that he was not afraid to 
attack his party when he felt that it was wrong. In 1951, Barry Goldwater declared his 
candidacy for the United States Senate. His friend and strategist, Stephen Shadegg, 
served as his campaign manager.41  He won an upset victory against the incumbent in 
1952. From that moment onward, Goldwater became a national voice for conservatives. 
In his speeches, votes, and legislative proposals, he consistently advocated for reducing 
the size of the federal government.42 However, there was something different about him 
than other Republicans in the Senate who avowed to have the same principles. Goldwater 
consistently challenged his party. This attitude even extended to the leader of the 
Republican Party, President Eisenhower. Goldwater publicly fought with the Eisenhower 
administration on budgets, the use of federal troops, and even referred to the president as 
a “dime store new dealer.”43  
When Goldwater was not fighting his party, he was attacking the pillars of the 
Democratic Party. He was known as a fierce opponent of the New Deal vision that had 
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become more accepted by the 1950s. Goldwater was even willing to attack the more 
popular elements of the program, such as the Tennessee Valley Authority. Goldwater 
strongly believed that it was anti-competitive for the Federal Government to engage in 
corporate ownership. In 1957, Goldwater found another target that he believed needed to 
be reformed: organized labor. After a Senate investigation into organized labor, 
Goldwater attacked the UAW and its leader, Walter Reuther. Goldwater went further than 
just labeling the unions as communists. He stated that they were much worse and much 
more dangerous than any communist threat in the United States.44 Senator Goldwater’s 
willingness to bluntly take on those whom he believed to be engaged in federal overreach 
or corruption, no matter how unpopular it was, made him a hero of the rank and file 
conservative members of the Republican Party.  
  
Secrecy to Draft Goldwater: Convincing a Reluctant Candidate to Run  
It would take experience and skill to convince Goldwater to run for the 
Presidency. It was widely known in 1961 that Goldwater would be a reluctant candidate 
for Presidency.45 Goldwater never gave his official consent to Manion’s attempt to 
elevate him the nomination in 1960.  After the failed convention coup, Goldwater told his 
supporters to "grow up" after they lost on the convention floor.46 This was one of the 
many reasons that White, Rusher, and Ashbrook decided not to even officially mention 
his name when recruiting participants for the meeting in Chicago. All three men knew 
that the events of the previous convention proved Goldwater was unwilling to risk 
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signing on to a haphazard anti-establishment campaign. If they were going to get him to 
run, they would already need to have the organization in place to prove to him that they 
could win the nomination. Their strategy was simple: run a successful campaign for a 
right-wing conservative to win the Republican Nomination for President in 1964 and use 
the new standard-bearer to reshape the party.47 However, this seemingly simple strategy 
had many complexities. 
After two months of work, the group met again at the Avenue Motel on December 
10. Although there some new people at the meeting, the secretive group mostly remained 
the same. The attendees reported back that they found the operation feasible, and White 
now possessed a $65,000 budget, most of which was raised by Barr from other 
executives. Most of this money was intended for White to attend Republican Committee 
meetings across the country and build a national organization.48 Under the guise of being 
in town for business trips, White was able to attend every national committee meeting 
and many regional committee meetings over the next year. As he kept attending these 
meetings, he was rapidly building his multi-regional network that was becoming known 
as the "Clif White Group.”49 This discrete network began to contain many current and 
former state party chairmen from across the country. Each of these state contacts was 
experienced and had control over large amounts of county-level organizing resources 
within their states. 
 In the spring of 1962, White called another meeting at the Three M Lodge in 
Minnesota of the men who met at the Avenue Motel just several months prior. The newly 
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expanded network began an expanded meeting, as now they met for two days rather than 
just four hours. White shared his number one priority with the group: to exert as much 
influence as they could over who became precinct committeemen in 1962. Clif White 
explained that these committeemen would serve terms through 1964, and the GOP 
eastern establishment overlooked the influence that they would hold over primaries and 
delegate section.50 
 By this point, White started to become more convinced that his ideas would come 
to fruition. After the meeting in Minnesota, he had even more faith in the men that he had 
recruited in the previous year along with Rusher and Ashbrook. He now thought each of 
them was sold enough and willing to execute the campaign pragmatically, that he could 
hand off more responsibilities to them as he built the organization. White also channeled 
his inner political organizer and realized that even if he came up short on delegates, he 
could still accomplish his goal. He stated that at this point, he realized that “we had 
distilled the techniques of this sort of thing, and all we needed to do was get into the gol-
darned convention with a halfway decent break.51 We didn't even need a majority. If we 
went within range of a majority, I felt that we had the techniques down and the operatives 
that we could put on the floor that we could take on anybody else” Things were 
beginning to look up for Clif White and his fellow conservatives. They only had one real 
problem; they still needed a candidate. 
 Senator Goldwater was in the process of telling his campaign team in Arizona to 
get ready to run for reelection when Clif White and Bill Rusher approached him in 
February of 1962 to informally probe him about running. Goldwater immediately shot the 
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proposal down but wanted to keep in contact with the two to pledge his support to 
whomever they may choose. When White’s network found out about this decision, they 
made the call to stay out of the business of picking a candidate until after the upcoming 
midterm elections in 1962.52 During this waiting period, they would continue to pick 
more people to run for precinct chairman of various areas across the country and attempt 
to raise more money. White and Rusher collected enough money to rent a two-room suite 
at the Chanin Building in downtown New York. The name of the room, Suite 3505, 
would go on to inspire the name of their organization, which they named the Suite 3505 
committee. The Suite 3505 Committee attempted to stay covert through their meetings in 
1962, but someone leaked their organization and their purpose to the press. Fortunately 
for the organizers, establishment party figures who read about their organization did not 
take their tactics or cause seriously, since other conservative insurgencies had ended so 
quickly.53 In late 1962, the midterm elections were finished, and it was time for the Suite 
3505 committee to select their candidate.  
 In December of 1962, they Suite 3505 Committee officially reorganized at the 
“Draft Goldwater Committee” headed by Texas Republican Party Chairman Peter 
O’Donnell, who was a close friend of Goldwater.54 Now with their candidate and purpose 
defined, the organization was ready to make headway. However, they still needed to 
convince one more supporter to achieve their purpose, and that was Senator Goldwater 
himself. From the moment of the leak that exposed all of the purposes of the Suite 3505 
committee to the public, Goldwater had grown distrustful of Clif White. One of his 
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advisors from his Senate staff had told Goldwater that the committee was likely a ploy to 
fundraise off of his name and provide salaries for those involved.55 This idea infuriated 
Goldwater, and he immediately cut off contact with White. He publicly asked the group 
not to use his name in late 1962, right before they chose to rename themselves after him. 
Luckily for White and the Draft Goldwater Committee, O'Donnell and Rusher were still 
able to keep contact with the Senator due to their prior relationships with him. 
Throughout 1963, the mass media speculated about a potential presidential run by 
Goldwater. The Senator still traveled across the country but began to notice something 
different. Larger and larger crowds became drawn to his rallies. On July 4, 1963, this was 
more obvious than ever as over 8,000 people attended Goldwater's speech held in 
Washington DC.56 
 Goldwater identified the Washington DC speech as a turning point in his attitude 
about the election.57 Later in the summer and throughout Autumn, Goldwater began to 
answer that he was considering pursuing the Presidency, rather than just outright denying 
the notion. Goldwater then put his senate campaign manager, Denny Kitchell, in contact 
with the Committee. Additionally, Goldwater told his longtime manager Stephen 
Shadegg to put a hold off on the senate reelection campaign and begin to recruit staff.58 
Goldwater became more and more personally enthusiastic about seeking the Presidency. 
However, the momentum of both Goldwater's attitude at the campaign would change 
following November 22, 1963. 
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 The assassination of President John F. Kennedy hit Barry Goldwater harder than 
most elected Republicans. Goldwater and Kennedy became fast friends in the Senate, 
although they rarely agreed on policy. Kennedy even consulted Goldwater in the oval 
office to gain his opinion on various foreign policy decisions.59 Even though Goldwater 
personally wrote that he found these sessions to give his advice on forgiven policy a "lost 
cause," he was more than happy to serve at the pleasure of the president.60 Goldwater told 
his inner circle that he felt Kennedy was one of the few men in the democratic party that 
he could run in a campaign of ideas against and not one based on attacks. Goldwater 
stated that even if he lost, he felt it would advance the cause of the Republican party to 
provide a true alternative to the democrats, without conservatives getting viscously 
attacked. After the assassination, Goldwater confided in his wife that he no longer wanted 
to run for president but felt as though he had to for the conservatives who had put their 
faith in him.61 
 
Conclusion 
Ultimately, Barry Goldwater would decide to run for president. His campaign was 
already provided the best delegate wining system designed to date by the Draft 
Goldwater Committee. Members of the Rockefeller campaign, which was set to be the 
chief nomination rival to Goldwater's Campaign, were completely unaware of their 
disadvantage from the start due to the efforts of White, Rusher, and Ashbrook. White 
could rest easy now knowing that his candidate was in the race but felt as though his real 
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job had just begun as he geared up to work on the campaign. However, White would be 
surprised to find out that he was not offered a senior position on the Goldwater for 
President Campaign. The man who had secured an early path to victory for Goldwater 
would not be part of the inner circle of the campaign as the Senator formally announced 
his intentions to run for president in February of 1964. The lack of experienced 
operatives in the early official Goldwater Campaign would prove to be a mistake that 
further illustrated the importance of these operatives.    
 34 
 
Chapter 2: Winning Illinois: Experience, Class and Gender in the Suburban 
Goldwater Coalition  
 
Experienced campaign operatives built the Draft Goldwater organization and 
convinced Barry Goldwater to run for the Presidency. By April of 1964, it was time for 
another group of experienced campaigners in Illinois to save the Goldwater Campaign 
from prematurely ending. Why was Illinois so important? The answer lies in the timeline 
of the primary. Illinois was positioned directly after a disappointing Goldwater 
performance in New Hampshire and just before the crucial winner-take-all primary in 
California. Simply put, Goldwater did not only need to win in Illinois, but he needed to 
win in a landslide. Who made this victory possible, and why was Illinois so suited for a 
Goldwater victory? In this chapter, I will illustrate that Barry Goldwater’s campaign in 
Illinois was filled with longtime Republican operatives and well connected to the party 
establishment in the state. The experience of these operatives stands in direct contrast to 
popular narratives that promote a purely anti-establishment nature of the Goldwater 
primary campaign. I will also illustrate that Barry Goldwater’s most loyal supporters 
were white professionals, suburban women, and small-town business owners. I believe 
that these findings reveal the political realities of changing GOP demographics and the 
competition between different elements of the party the establishment in Illinois. In order 
to support this argument, I will first examine the structure of Goldwater’s campaign 
structure in New Hampshire and explore why that campaign failed. I will then compare 
this to the highly organized structure of the Illinois campaign and examine the success 
that the campaign found in Illinois. Finally, this chapter will examine the background of 
individual Goldwater delegates to reveal that essential elements of the Illinois campaign 
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included suburban insiders, white professionals, and women. I will conclude that it was 
this experienced coalition that ultimately delivered a landslide victory for Goldwater in 
the 1964 Illinois primary.    
 
Failures in New Hampshire 
 The Goldwater campaign lacked the professional staff and discipline to run a 
good campaign in the first three months of 1964. This fact made the first several months 
of Senator Goldwater's bid for President very difficult. Various obstacles met the 
campaign since Senator Goldwater first declared his candidacy. Announcing his 
candidacy in his home city, a place that did not award him any extra political momentum 
in the fight for the nomination, frustrated some of his advisors.1 This first primary 
campaign misstep would certainly not be the last. Goldwater's candidacy stumbled out of 
the announcement in Phoenix and went headfirst into the fight to win the New Hampshire 
primary. Goldwater's novice campaign staff proved to be unprepared for the national 
spotlight. They lacked the skill to establish a campaign in New Hampshire that extended 
beyond what the Draft Goldwater Committee had already set up.2 Issues with the 
campaign ranged from the staff to Goldwater himself.  Goldwater was suffering from 
both physical pains following recent back surgery and mental pain concerning his 
anguish about running in the wake of the assassination of President Kennedy.3 These 
factors combined with Goldwater's already unrefined campaign style to create a month 
filled with gaffes leading up to the New Hampshire Primary. The senator created plenty 
of material for his opponents concerning the issues of nuclear weapons, civil rights, and 
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social security.4 Some of these moments were willingly misinterpreted by opponents, 
while others were positions held by Goldwater that were not mainstream. Regardless of 
the interpretation of these quotes, they all did damage to a Goldwater Campaign that 
simply did not have staff experienced enough to respond to opposition appropriately.5 
 The combination of Arizona operatives and unexperienced New Hampshire 
workers became deadly for the campaign. The internal polls of the Goldwater campaign 
showed trouble in late January.6 The numbers showed the senator leading the field by a 
diminishing amount. Despite these warning signs, Goldwater refused any advice to stop 
speaking on controversial issues.7 The New Hampshire Citizens for Goldwater 
organization was led by Robert and Rachel Robins, a working class couple from Nashua. 
Although they were able to build some grass roots enthusiasm, both of them lacked any 
significant prior campaign experience.8 The leadership in the official campaign was more 
qualified, as Goldwater’s state campaign director was New Hampshire Speaker of the 
House Stewart Lamprey.9 However, campaign advisors such as Lamprey were not part of 
Goldwater’s inner circle. Goldwater let his inner circle, often dubbed the “Arizona 
Mafia”, override local politicians in the New Hampshire campaign.10 The Goldwater 
campaign gained credence by the fact that their chief rival, Nelson Rockefeller, was 
doing just as poorly in the state as they were. Rockefeller's policies were simply just too 
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liberal for most New Hampshire voters.11 His recent divorce and remarriage was also 
extremely controversial and garnered plenty of media attention.12  
 Being the better of the two dysfunctional campaigns in New Hampshire would not 
be a workable model as a new contender entered the race: Vietnam Ambassador Henry 
Cabot Lodge Jr. The Draft Lodge campaign quickly opened offices in New Hampshire 
weeks before the primary date. Robert Mullen, a former New Hampshire Eisenhower 
campaign operative, ran the Lodge campaign. Mullen used a small but highly organized 
campaign team to create a formidable write-in campaign for Lodge.13 Mullen’s team 
consisted almost entirely of experienced local operatives, which drew a sharp contrast to 
the Goldwater campaign.14 This last-minute insurgent campaign was even able to escape 
substantial media attention.15 On March 10, 1964, it was the Lodge campaign that proved 
victorious with a first-place finish. Goldwater and Rockefeller placed a distant second 
and third, respectively.16 This loss was not a mortal blow to the Goldwater's bid, but it 
was one that required serious attention.   
 The failures of the New Hampshire campaign illustrated the importance of skilled 
and experienced campaign organizers. A poll commissioned one year before the primary 
had shown Goldwater leading all other candidates in New Hampshire by 38 percent.17 
However, this early momentum was lost quickly. The results of the New Hampshire 
Primary made it clear to the campaign that grassroots enthusiasm could not alone be 
directly translated to primary victories. April of 1964 was a critical time for the 
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Goldwater campaign. The day after the New Hampshire Primary results were announced, 
Goldwater vowed not to repeat the mistakes of New Hampshire on national television. 
The campaign was reorganized to establish a more succinct command structure. Richard 
Kleindienst, a veteran of the Arizona Republican Party with connections to the national 
party, would assume control of the states that used a primary system to select delegates.  
Clif White, founder of the draft Goldwater movement was elevated into the campaign to 
oversee operations in states that used a convention process to assign delegates.18 These 
two shared the position of “Co-Directors of Field Operations.”19 White felt that he should 
have received a position in the campaign earlier, but was enthusiastic about his fight to 
win delegates for the campaign.20 The new promotions showed that Goldwater was 
finally ready to expand the management of the campaign and bring on more experienced 
operatives. Goldwater's new team would need to change the momentum of the race. 
Goldwater's demoralizing second-place finish in New Hampshire was rapidly spreading 
through the media.   
 
Second Chance in Illinois 
The Goldwater campaign was in desperate need of a momentum shift after New 
Hampshire, and Illinois would prove to be the best place to do this. The path forward was 
clear: win the confidence of delegates and finish first in the winner-take-all California 
Primary to reestablish Goldwater as the frontrunner for the nomination. There was one 
more electoral contest before that path to redemption could begin. This crucial contest 
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was the Illinois Primary. The stakes were so critical that White and Kleindienst would 
both assume control of the local campaign operation in the state.21 The campaign simply 
could not afford another loss akin to what they suffered in New Hampshire. The approach 
that the campaign took in Illinois bore little resemblance to that taken in New Hampshire.   
 In sharp contrast to their efforts in New Hampshire, the Goldwater campaign 
benefited from an extensive campaign staffed by experienced operatives in Illinois. 
Congressmen Ed Derwinski was the chairman of the Volunteers for Goldwater 
organization.22 Derwinski represented Illinois' fourth congressional district. The fourth 
district covered much of the western and southwestern suburbs of Chicago, including 
Derwinski's hometown of Glen Ellyn. Derwinski’s own suburban district would be 
critical to delivering a victory for the Goldwater campaign. Derwinski was a conservative 
army veteran and had a reputation for his conservative stances in congress. Charlie Barr, 
an assistant to the executive at the Standard Oil Company and a very early Goldwater 
supporter, was also part of Volunteers for Goldwater.23 Barr was considered "[t]he most 
knowledgeable Republican in the Midwest," according to Stephen Shadegg of the 
Goldwater Campaign.24 The co-chairman of the Volunteers for Goldwater Organization 
was Patricia Hutar. Hutar was Vice President of the Republican Citizens League in 
Illinois, worked for the Nixon campaign, and was a strategist for President Eisenhower’s 
Illinois campaigns.25 Much like White, Ashbrook, and Rusher, Hutar had become more 
conservative in recent years and now brought credibility and experience to the Volunteers 
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for Goldwater. The broad-ranging influence of Barr, Derwinski, and Hutar made the 
Volunteers for Goldwater Organization an experienced and capable political force.   
  Illinois Volunteers for Goldwater was extraordinarily active and organizing in 
Illinois months before the primary was even held. They held several fundraisers and 
campaign events starting in January. The events included a welcoming reception for 
Goldwater at O’Hare airport in February and a rally in March, with approximately 8,000 
people in attendance.26 The campaign opened up more headquarters across the state, 
eventually opening one in each of the state’s 24 congressional districts save for three in 
heavily democratic areas of Chicago. Even more district headquarters for the Illinois 
campaign opened on March 15 in the Chicago suburbs of Arlington Heights and Mount 
Prospect, demonstrating the strong suburban presence of the campaign.27 Candidates for 
various state offices aligned themselves with the Goldwater Campaign. Charles Percy, a 
moderate to liberal Republican running for Goldwater, traveled to both headquarters 
openings to rally supporters.28 The momentum of the Illinois campaign was strong 
enough that even many liberal Republicans, like Percy, were rushing to support the 
campaign.29 The Strength of the Goldwater Campaign in Illinois was so immense that 
many members of the GOP field decided to sit out the primary contest. Rockefeller, 
Lodge, and others simply passed over the contest for fear of looking weak and losing to 
Goldwater there.30 
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Goldwater did not merely need a victory in Illinois; he needed a landslide. One 
candidate remained to campaign against Goldwater, and that was Senator Margaret Chase 
Smith. Smith came close to last in the New Hampshire primary.31 The Illinois primary 
offered her the chance to be a viable alternative to Goldwater and boost her little-known 
campaign. The image of a massive win for Goldwater mattered a great deal in this contest 
if California and convention delegations were to be won. The large Goldwater 
organization in Illinois had not gone unnoticed, and the lack of competition significantly 
increased expectations for Goldwater in the contest.32 Goldwater's substantial investment 
in Illinois set the expectation for a massive win in the state. More events were held to 
rally support, including fundraisers, community dinners, and rallies.33 On April 10, 
Goldwater arrived in Chicago and gave a significant speech sponsored by the Youth for 
Goldwater Committee and the Illinois campaign.34 The evening rally with over 8,000 
participants was carried live six local television stations. Derwinski, Hutar, and all of the 
leading members of the Illinois campaign, along with state politicians such as Charles 
Percy and Sheriff Richard Ogilvie, were in attendance.35 The massive rally energized 
supporters, but also served to raise the already high expectations for Goldwater's 
performance.  
The Illinois primary results delivered the victory that the Goldwater Campaign 
desperately needed. When the primary vote took place on April 14, Goldwater won with 
about 63 percent of the vote to Senator Smith’s 27 percent.36 Although some political 
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pundits and editorialists labeled the success as relatively "weak" compared to the 
expectations that were set for victory, most agreed that this showing reestablished 
momentum for the campaign.37 The statewide vote was an important symbol of who 
would be able to turn out Republican voters and be a capable nominee.  
 
Goldwater Delegates: Geography, Class, and Gender  
 However, the statewide preference ballot mattered very little in the battle at the 
convention to elect a nominee. The election of state convention delegates on that same 
day was much more critical for the campaign. In each of the state's 24 congressional 
districts, two delegates and two alternate delegates were selected to represent Illinois at 
the GOP convention in San Francisco. Some delegate candidates chose to pledge 
themselves to the candidate they supported. In contrast, others ran as un-pledged 
delegates vowing to either side with the majority of other delegates at the convention or 
use their judgment for who would be the best nominee. Thirty-one out of Illinois’ forty-
eight elected delegates who were chosen on April 14 were pledged to Goldwater.38 The 
remaining 17 were un-pledged delegates, and no delegate pledged to another candidate 
managed to win a seat. This resounding victory in winning the state's delegation pushed 
the Goldwater campaign forward. To win these delegates, Cliff White created a very 
intricate selection process. 
 Many factors about the Goldwater Campaign and politics in the state of Illinois in 
1964 can be discovered by examining this delegate campaign process. Each of the state’s 
24 congressional districts held elections for four representatives to the national 
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convention from Illinois. These representatives included two delegates and two alternate 
delegates who were only to go in the case that the elected initially representatives could 
not make it to the convention. Forty-eight of the state’s fifty-eight delegates attending the 
GOP convention would be selected in this manner, so it was exceedingly crucial for the 
Goldwater campaign to be judicious in whom they chose as their supported candidates. 
The campaign engaged in large amounts of correspondence to obtain the potential 
delegates' professional, personal, and financial information. Heading up this process was 
Lombard, Illinois resident Douglas Gunkel, the Chief Coordinator for Illinois Volunteers 
for Goldwater.39 Gunkel was a coordinator in a successful state treasurer campaign just 
four years prior and was a runner up for The Most Outstanding Member of the Year in 
the National Young Republicans organization.40 While Clif White oversaw the general 
delegate selection process, it was Douglas Gunkel who vetted and assessed the potential 
candidates. Each of these candidates ran under their own names on the ballot. No 
information on that ballot told of their presidential candidate preferences. The ballot 
situation made Gunkel's job not only to determine who would be loyal to Goldwater in 
the campaign but also to determine which delegate candidates could win the contest in 
their own right. This process left behind many pages of documentation. These documents 
create valuable insight into who composed Goldwater's campaign in the 1964 Illinois 
primary, and where they were successful. 
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There was a bright contrast in the geographic support of Barry Goldwater in the 
primary. Goldwater's main opposition in the delegate races came from Chicago. Of the 
forty-eight delegates that Illinois sent to the GOP convention in 1964, only eleven of 
them were not wholeheartedly committed to voting for Barry Goldwater. Nine of these 
delegates were from Chicago, and two were from southern Illinois. From Chicago, Genoa 
S. Washington and Euclid Taylor of the First District were the only two African 
American members of the Illinois delegation.41 They both firmly stated that they would 
not support Goldwater, and Douglas Gunkel put them in a category of delegates that 
would safely win their election, but that could not be convinced to support Goldwater.42 
Even among delegates who did not directly oppose Senator Goldwater from Chicago, 
there was still a distinct lack of enthusiasm. Delegates like Allen Freeman voiced their 
support of Goldwater simply because he had the support of the majority of Illinois 
delegates.43  
This lack of enthusiasm in parts of Chicago could not be more sharply contrasted 
by the support that Goldwater received in Chicago’s suburbs.  On November 19, 1963, 
William H. “Bill” Rentschler of Lake Forest Illinois wrote Barry Goldwater to inform 
him of his decision to run as an “all the way” Goldwater delegate in the 1964 Illinois 
Primary.44 Goldwater had not publicly announced yet, but Bill Rentschler wanted to let 
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him know that he had already been laying the groundwork for a possible campaign. This 
sort of letter from Bill Rentschler was not a small matter. Rentschler was the former head 
of the Illinois United Republican Fund, making him the highest-ranking GOP fundraiser 
in the state.45 Rentschler was an alumnus of Princeton University and President and 
Chairman of Stevens Candy Company in Chicago.46 Rentschler traveled the state in early 
1964 to host fundraisers for candidates seeking a variety of offices. During these events, 
Rentschler tabled himself as a "citizen politician," and he gained a reputation as an 
extremely conservative member of the party.47 Rentschler had put his ideology aside and 
often helped more moderate members of the party. He served as a member of platform 
committees for President Eisenhower and supported the moderate Charles Percy for 
governor. However, in 1964 he stated that it was time to support a presidential candidate 
who could stand by their convictions and combat the "unsound, outmoded, and often 
irresponsible policies of every Democratic President since the advent of the New Deal.”48 
Rentschler was joined by many other politically connected suburban businessmen and 
professionals who felt the need to run as delegates to support Senator Goldwater. 
The class background of Mr. Rentschler was typical of Goldwater supporting 
delegates. In the suburbs, every delegate pledged to Goldwater came from an upper 
middle-class household. Relatively young, white, business professionals appeared to 
make up the base of Goldwater's support in these areas. Guy Hughs, a real estate 
executive from Joliet, was a staunch supporter of Goldwater, and Clifford Carlson, a 
corporate lawyer from Geneva and a member of Clif White’s Young Republicans 
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organization, was also firmly in the Goldwater camp. In more rural areas, the trends of 
politically connected business owners and professional supporting Goldwater still held in 
place. William Booth, from Decatur Illinois, a town in the central portion of the state, 
was a bearing company director and machine company owner.49 Mr. Booth was involved 
in party politics before at the county and precinct level. Gunkel marked Booth as being 
heavily favored to win the election in his district. Dr. Clifford Cryer, a surgeon from El 
Paso, Illinois, had been very active in county politics and had been a country chairman 
for the party. Both Mr. Booth and Dr. Cryer represent the professional background of 
Goldwater's rural supporting delegates. The only Goldwater supporting delegates who do 
not fit this profile were female candidates.   
The highest-profile female delegate candidate in Illinois was the nationally known 
activist Phyllis Schlafly of Alton, a suburb just east of St Lois50 She began her political 
experience in 1946 as a member of the American Enterprise Institute. During her time at 
AEI, she was a high profile advocate for conservative Republicans. Her weekly radio 
program and civic involvement in the St. Louis area provided a way for her to spread her 
conservative ideology.51 Nationally, she was a major figure of dissent at both the 1952 
and 1960 GOP conventions, and not let the convention become “stolen” by the part 
establishment again in 1964.52 Gunkel had no doubt that Schlafly would be able to win 
her seat and marked her down as a possible leader to keep other delegates focused on 
voting for Goldwater in the convention. Gunkel also noted the fact that Schlafly was so 
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well known and such a good speaker that the campaign would not even have to spend 
money in her race.53 Schlafly's position as the President of the Illinois Federation of 
Republican Women, an organization that had wide-ranging capabilities across the whole 
state, also allowed her to exert influence on delegate races other than her own.   
 Many other suburban female candidates who enthusiastically supported Barry 
Goldwater were running in Illinois. One such candidate was Lucinda O. Wanner of the 
14th congressional district. Wanner was a resident of Glen Ellyn, Illinois, a town in the 
western suburbs of Chicago. Like Schlafly, Wanner was also involved in the Illinois 
Federation of Republican Women as their director of campaign operations.54 She also 
extended her involvement to the national level as a member of the National Federation of 
Republican Women. Beyond women's organizations, she was the chair of the DuPage 
County Republican Party and authored pamphlets on how to increase GOP voter turnout. 
Very conservative positions left little room for doubt that she would be a Goldwater 
supporter. Gunkel marked her down as being a lock on winning the seat and stated: 
"She'll be with us to the bitter end.”55 Dorothy L. Murphy, a candidate to become an 
alternate delegate in the same district, was also marked down as a solid Goldwater 
supporter.56 She was actively involved in the Will Country Republican Party and 
Republican Women's clubs. However, Murphy's involvement was not purely political and 
was involved in the PTA, Joliet Women's Club, and Sunday School Teaching.57 All of 
these women represented a rising force that was beginning to show itself in this contest. 
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 Many of these women who supported Goldwater were married to husbands who 
fit the class profile of many Illinois Goldwater activists. Lucinda Wanner’s husband, 
Arthur Wanner, was an executive of the Beldon Corporation, member of the Church 
Board, and a GOP donor.58 John Schlafly, Phyllis Schlafly’s husband, was a corporate 
attorney from a wealthy suburban St. Louis family.59 Dorthey Murphy’s husband was a 
business executive and involved in various local clubs, such as the Elk Lodge.60 The 
careers of these women, the careers of their husbands, and where they lived all 
demonstrate that they were members of the upper-middle class and lived in business and 
professional households. However, while their husband’s occupations provide context, it 
should not be implied that these women were working on behalf of their husbands in their 
political activism. Goldwater delegate paperwork and newspaper reports make minimal 
mention of them. They exerted much less poetical influence than their wives.   
 The selection of female candidates was entirely supportive of Goldwater. Of these 
nine women, five of them won seats in the delegation. All of these women were 
connected to Schlafly's Illinois Federation of Republican Women, and they all supported 
Barry Goldwater. None of the women running for the delegate or alternate positions were 
committed to anyone else besides Barry Goldwater. Two women who were elected, 
Phyllis Schlafly and Marguerite Church, were tapped to be leaders of the delegation to 
ensure loyalty to Senator Goldwater. Much like the men, geographically, four of these 
five women were from suburbs. The sole woman in the delegation from the city of 
Chicago, Marie Suthers, lived only blocks away from the border of the Oak Lawn and 
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was involved in activities in that suburb.61 This roster of female delegates was more 
extensive than any other previous Illinois GOP convention delegation.62 
 
Conclusion 
 The winning coalition of business professionals, female activists, and established 
Illinois politicians delivered the Illinois Republican Primary victory to Goldwater. This 
state campaign marked a departure from the attempts to run a purely grassroots campaign 
in New Hampshire and gave much better results. Middle and high-level GOP operatives 
were able to galvanize the conservative base with a highly organized campaign and 
succeed where previous conservative efforts had failed. The story of Illinois primary and 
Draft Goldwater movement both illustrate that the early successes of the Goldwater 
Campaign can be attributed to these experienced operatives. 
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Chapter 3: Suburban Legacy: Veterans of the Illinois Goldwater Campaign 
 “An entire generation of conservatives owes you its deepest thanks”: this was Phil 
Crane’s closing statement in a letter to Barry Goldwater in 1977.1 This statement from 
Crane, at that point a nationally known conservative himself, was not made as merely a 
courteous remark. Crane attributed the foundation of his political career, which would go 
on to span many decades, to his time in the Goldwater campaign. Many individuals who 
supported Goldwater’s campaign for the Presidency would go on to serve various 
influential roles for many years after the end of the campaign. In this chapter, I will argue 
that the conservative legacy of the Goldwater campaign took various forms ranging from 
very conservative legislation and activism to anti-establishment fervor that was not bound 
to a specific ideology. I will also argue that the suburban legacy of the Illinois campaign 
can range from local legislation to national implications for the Republican Party. I will 
examine four individuals who can be traced back to the 1964 campaign in order to 
support this argument. The first two individuals are Lucinda O. Wanner and her daughter, 
Lucinda Wanner Kasperson, who were both suburban Republican activists and local 
politicians. I will then examine William Rentschler, a businessman, and author who 
despised establishment politics, attacked the New Right, and claimed to be carrying on 
the legacy of Goldwater. Finally, I will explore the career of Phil Crane, the longtime US 
Representative from the western suburbs of Chicago, who gained national notoriety for 
his conservative stances in Congress. 
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A Family Affair: Conservative Women in the Suburbs 
 Lucinda O. Wanner was one of the most loyal Goldwater supporters within the 
Illinois delegation at the 1964 Republican Convention. As a delegate for her western 
suburban 13th district, the Goldwater campaign designated Wanner as a leader to ensure 
other delegates stayed loyal to Goldwater at the convention. However, her involvement in 
local GOP politics did not end after the 1964 election. By 1968, Wanner had won the 
position of chairwoman of the DuPage County Republican Central Committee.2 Wanner 
used her position to promote the involvement of women in GOP politics. Wanner held 
multiple women's luncheons, both inside and outside of the county, that acted as 
workshops on voter registration, precinct canvassing, and campaign fundraising.3 During 
her time in county politics, Wanner was not shy about her conservative beliefs. She 
openly accused other Republicans of “me-tooism” regarding following liberal democratic 
policies.4 Wanner went on to serve as a delegate for the 13th congressional district again 
in 1968, where she was a supporter of Ronald Reagan for the presidential nomination.5 In 
1970, Wanner was able to successfully work with her successor, DuPage County District 
Chairman James Phillip, to abolish the personal property tax in the county.6 Wanner also 
voiced her opposition to the Equal Rights Amendment and Women’s Liberation 
Movement.7 Wanner stated that the nomination of Barry Goldwater made her more 
comfortable with the party, and emboldened her conservative beliefs.8 Lucinda Wanner’s 
record shows that she continued to use the experience that she gained before the 1964 
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election, and applied it to conservative politics in DuPage County for several years after. 
However, the political involvement of the Wanner Family did not end with Lucinda O. 
Wanner’s retirement from politics.  
Lucinda Wanner Kasperson continued the legacy of her mother’s career 
conservative politics for decades following the 1964 election. Born Lucinda Wanner in 
1928, Kasperson grew up in a pollical household. She became the first female Ph.D. 
graduate in economics at the University of Pennsylvania and taught the subject at Loyola 
University in Chicago.9 She and her husband moved to the northern Chicago suburb of 
Northbrook in the mid-1960s. It was in Northbrook where Kasperson, much like her 
mother, would become involved in local politics. By 1967, Kasperson had already won a 
seat on the Northbrook Village Board.10 Her skill allowed her to rise through the ranks of 
local politics. In 1972, Kasperson was elected as an alternate delegate to the Republican 
National Convention, and in 1980, she became the village president of Northbrook.1112  
Lucinda Kasperson used her platform in local politics to promote conservative 
ideas for many decades. As Village President, Kasperson only signed on to public 
projects as long as there was not a tax increase associated with it for residents.13 She 
described herself as a “conservative republican” and made it a point to attend party 
conventions and the inaugurations of Republican Presidents.14 Even after her tenure as 
village president ended, Kasperson’s passion for limited government remained.  In 2014, 
when a debate arose about whether the city of Northbrook should use taxpayer funds to 
 
9 “Lucinda Kasperson Obituary,” Chicago Tribune, August 26, 2018. 
10 “Northbrook,” Chicago Tribune, July 1, 1967. 
11 “Stone Plans to Run as GOP Delegate,” Chicago Tribune, January 6, 1972.  
12 "Northbrook OKs Cable TV Pact," October 8, 1982.  
13 “Northbrook OKs Housing Plan for The Elderly,” Chicago Tribune, December 9, 1982. 
14 “Lucinda Kasperson Obituary,” Chicago Tribune, August 26, 2018. 
 53 
 
construct business development, Kasperson re-entered politics to become one of the 
leading advocates against the measure. Kasperson felt the proposal ignored the free 
market and stated, "I'm deeply troubled. Commercial development is not appropriate for 
government funding."15 Nearly fifty years after Lucina Wanner became emboldened to 
fight for conservative causes by Goldwater’s 1964 campaign, her daughter was 
continuing to fight for those same causes at the municipal level.  
 
The Anti-Establishment Moderate  
William Rentschler was a staunch public supporter of Barry Goldwater and a 
well-connected Republican in Illinois during the presidential campaign. Rentschler was 
one of the first would-be delegates to pledge his support for Barry Goldwater in 1964 
GOP Primary.16 He used his connections to continue traveling across the state and 
campaign for Goldwater and gave fundraising speeches at Republican party events across 
the state. Rentschler was chosen by the Illinois GOP leadership to head a citizen’s 
committee that proposed qualified candidates to run for various state offices.17 Rentschler 
described the 1964 election as a “once in a lifetime opportunity” in which the citizens of 
the state could kick off a revolution in good government by voting republican for all state 
and federal offices.18 Many of these candidates were well connected to the establishment 
of the state party, and Rentschler seemed to have no problem with that. His public 
rhetoric during this election was much like it had been for his entire political career: 
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conservative and not any type of challenge to Republicans running in the state. However, 
his tone would change after the election.  
 The 1964 election brought out anti-establishment ideology in Rentschler. During 
the primary election, he was careful not to attack other Republicans as so many other 
Goldwater surrogates did, and instead shifted his attacks on to Democrats.19 He was most 
comfortable picking apart democratic programs and supporting the GOP ticket. Despite 
the massive GOP loss, both in Illinois and nationally, Rentschler continued his practices 
of speaking to GOP groups across the state and promoting party causes. However, after 
the elections 1964, his tone on other Republicans harshened. In 1968, Rentschler stated 
that Republicans had grown complacent and needed to police themselves if they wished 
to maintain the party, and he helped author a book that attacked members of the state 
GOP.20 His rhetoric stayed relatively conservative but became increasingly critical of the 
Illinois Republican Party. His criticism of the party would come to a head in 1970 US 
Senate Election. 
 William Rentschler’s 1970 primary challenge against an incumbent Republican 
senator solidified his opposition to the establishment Republican Party. Ralph Tyler 
Smith was appointed to the US Senate seat by Republican Governor Richard Ogilvie 
upon the death of Everett Dirksen.21 The state party, both liberals and conservatives for 
the most part, lined up behind Smith as their candidate.22 Rentschler felt that Smith was a 
weak candidate, not that conservative, and as an appointed senator had no right to the 
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seat.23 In sharp contrast to his belief that the GOP was fundamentally the better party six 
years earlier, Rentschler stated that in this election, the state GOP effort to elect Smith 
was no better than the democratic machine.24 Rentschler considered his campaign to be 
"grassroots", and modeled it after the Goldwater campaign that he previously 
supported.25 He did not just model his campaign after Goldwater in anti-establishment 
messaging, but also geography. Rentschler made a play to win the western suburbs in 
DuPage County by capitalizing off of the conservatives there that Goldwater had won in 
a landslide and by capturing anti-Ogelvie sentiment.26 Rentschler campaigned heavily in 
the county. However, unlike Goldwater, his campaign was not built on a conservative 
ideological challenge to the party. This campaign, although still influenced by Goldwater, 
was built on pure anti-establishment sentiment. Rentschler only attacked Smith for his 
"bossism" and connections to a corrupt system but did not claim to be to the incumbent's 
ideological right.27 This strategy would not win DuPage County or the state for 
Rentschler.  
 Following his failed Senate bid, Rentschler gained more prominence as a voice 
against the Republican establishment. He voiced his concerns for Ogilvie’s re-election 
bid for governor and attempted to become involved in the 1972 elections, but the state 
GOP cut him out of the process.28 In 1976, he was convicted of bank fraud for making 
false statements when applying for business loans. Rentschler claimed that the 
prosecutor, a well-connected Republican named Jim Thomson, was leading an effort to 
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punish him for his past political activities.29 Following his short imprisonment, 
Rentschler once again gained popularity as an editorial writer. His pieces revealed that 
his political views had moved to the center, but his dislike for the establishment of the 
Republican Party held steadfast. Now, his criticism grew beyond the Illinois state GOP 
and expanded to the party as a whole. He penned articles advocating for prison reform, 
elimination of the death penalty, advocating for gun control, and more, all while 
chastising the GOP for not doing more in these areas.30 By the early 1990s he claimed 
that racism, talk radio divisiveness, and lack of concern for violence made him ashamed 
to call himself a Republican.31 
Rentschler considered himself one of the last true Goldwater Republicans. He 
stated that he had not become more liberal, but rather that he still opposed the GOP party 
establishment which now claimed to be more conservative on social issues.32 Rentschler 
seemed to consider himself an heir to the senator's legacy and mentioned him in columns. 
Rentschler reminisced, saying that "I do consider Barry A true heroic figure," and that he 
was "above the fray."33 Rentschler went on to write an entire book dedicated to the legacy 
of Barry Goldwater. From his influence in the 1964 campaign, Rentschler had gained an 
anti-establishment sentiment that caused him to distrust elected officials and become 
more moderate over time in comparison to the rest of the party. This could not be more 
different than the path taken by another Illinoisan who was also a self-proclaimed heir to 
Goldwater’s legacy, Phil Crane.  
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Rightward Shift: Phil Crane and Changing the Republican Party 
Phil Crane was raised in a conservative background and immersed himself in the 
ideals of the Goldwater Campaign. Crane came from an upper-middle-class family in 
Chicago. Crane's father, George Crane, was a physician and noted psychological 
columnist.34 After getting his graduate degree in history, Crane moved to the central 
Illinois city of Peoria to teach at Bradley University. Eventually, he would leave this job 
to work for the Goldwater Campaign. Crane described his childhood as being raised in a 
family with conservative "firm values," so the campaign appealed to him.35 He served as 
director of research and a messaging director for the Illinois operations in the campaign.36 
Crane would later credit the campaign, and Barry Goldwater specifically, for providing 
him with his ideological foundations.37 Crane also authored a pamphlet for the national 
Goldwater campaign entitled “The Big Lie!.”38 This publication was an inspiring 
firebrand essay to encourage other conservatives to help the campaign.39 After the 
election, Crane decided to move to the western suburbs of Chicago. Crane would 
continue to build the rest of his career in the suburbs. 
 Phil Crane ran as a conservative Republican for the open US House seat in the 
western suburban congressional district that Goldwater had won four years earlier. 
Goldwater carried DuPage country, which encompassed the entire district, with over 60 
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percent of the vote.40 The conventional wisdom was that Phil Crane was clearly the most 
conservative option in the ten candidate field seeking the GOP nomination in the district. 
Crane was an underdog as the campaign started. Crane was running against state 
representatives and well-connected businessmen.41 As the primary campaign drew on, 
though, the field narrowed down to Crane and State Senator John Nimrod. Nimrod was a 
self-described “Regular Republican” and ran a much more moderate campaign than 
Crane.42  Crane bolstered his campaign by connecting himself to Goldwater, and by 
touting himself as an academic and not a politician. Crane described himself to the media 
as just a professor who wanted to make a difference in government.43 He made arguments 
against several welfare programs and attacked social security in the campaign as well.44 
He also claimed his status as a conservative intellectual, picking up endorsements from 
Charles Buckley and the National Review. These controversial positions and 
endorsements earned Crane various enemies in the primary. Columnist Rick Friedman, 
along with many liberal republicans, attacked Crane throughout the election. Friedman 
finished an article on the 13th district special election with the remarks, "Phil Crane scares 
the hell out of me. Vote for Phil Crane at your own peril.”45 
The suburban 13th congressional district would continue its contribution to the 
conservative movement with the election of Phil Crane to the US House of 
Representatives in 1969. Crane won the primary by a much larger margin than expected 
by local Republicans that left his opponents stunned. Crane’s victory was described as a 
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“grassroots victory of the people” by supporter Robert Bergman.46 His opponents decried 
it as elevating a radical with no qualifications to a seat in Congress. However, the newly 
elected Republican congressman had more political experience than either side would 
have liked to admit in the election. In the years since the Goldwater campaign, Crane had 
traveled the country as a campaign strategist, gave lectures on how to win elections, and 
worked as a researcher for the 1968 Nixon presidential campaign.47 Upon Crane's arrival 
in Congress, the Republican Party immediately put him to work assisting the campaigns 
of incumbent members of Congress.48 Despite his own misleading rhetoric, Crane was 
not purely a grassroots politician, but was a conservative insider. 
 Crane would use his experience and skills to promote his conservative ideals in 
the Republican Party. One such way he would do this was with the founding of The 
Republican Study Committee in Congress. Crane and Paul Weyrich, another veteran of 
both the Young Republicans and Goldwater's 1964 campaign, founded the Republican 
Study Committee as a way to put pressure on the moderate house GOP leadership. The 
Republican Study Committee was able to bring conservative positions to prominence in 
the house GOP by threatening any leader with its bloc of votes and campaign finance 
connections. The Republican Study Committee pushed the house leadership to eliminate 
34 billion dollars from the budget that it considered to be waste and fraud, all while 
receiving favorable reports for doing so in the press.49 In 1979, the Republican Study 
Committee was able to block the adoption of suggestions from the United Nations 
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regarding child safety and arms reduction.50  The Republican Study Committee was also 
able to successfully target some liberal incumbents in Congress for re-election, such as 
New York Senator Jacob Javits, who lost to a conservative challenge backed by the 
committee.51 Through pressure he applied as chairman of the committee both inside 
Congress and in campaigns, Crane was helping to move the GOP to the right.  Outside of 
the Study Committee, he personally crusaded against government waste and began audits 
of the United Stated Military during his first several years in office. Crane also ran the 
Illinois Campaign for Ronald Reagan in 1976, headed up the American Conservative 
Union, and became a prominent critic of President Jimmy Carter.52  Crane even launched 
a brief Presidential bid himself in 1980, although he would drop out in favor of Ronald 
Reagan. Crane’s success in moving the House GOP to his positions would also be his 
undoing, as he would begin to lose his popularity due to, in part, no longer being any 
more conservative than his colleagues.  
Phil Crane's most significant legislative impact would come about in the 1990s. 
Crane no longer felt the need to fight with house leadership. Leaders who were just as 
conservative as he now led the party, such as Newt Gingrich. Crane became vice-
chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee. He became specialized in trade 
policy during his time in the Republican majority, which allowed him to implement many 
of the free trade policies that the Goldwater campaign advocated for so many years 
prior.53 Crane’s legislative accomplishments continued to further the agenda set forward 
by the Goldwater campaign that was deemed radical in the decades before. The lack of 
 
50 “A Silly Debate About Children,” Chicago Tribune, June 26, 1979. 
51 “D’Amato’s Drive will Steer Right,” New York Daily News, September 11, 1980.  
52 “Crane Goes After President,” Chicago Tribune, January 30, 1978. 
53  “Capitol Beat,” Chicago Tribune, November 27, 1995. 
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controversy in Crane’s positions in the house or in his legislation at the time illustrates 
how successful the conservative wing of the party had been since such things would have 
been unthinkable twenty years prior when Crane founded the Study Committee.  
 
Conclusion: 
The trajectories of conservative leadership after 1964 listed above illustrate the 
diversity of the Goldwater Campaign's suburban legacy. The career of Lucinda Wanner 
illustrates a relatively experienced insider at the county level who felt emboldened to take 
more conservative stands after the campaign. Her daughter, Lucinda Kasperson, 
illustrates how long conservative ideology was able to prevail in the suburbs and how it 
applied to local issues. William Rentschler’s career reveals the complex nature of the 
campaign that touched on anti-establishment politics more than ideology. Rentschler fell 
out of the graces of the Illinois GOP establishment and began to see himself as a fighter 
who carried Goldwater's anti-establishment legacy. He continued to fight the Republican 
Party establishment even as they became ideologically closer to the platforms of the 1964 
Goldwater campaign that he supported. Phil Crane's election to the House of 
Representatives reveals that the suburbs of Chicago were still a foundation for 
conservative insiders after the 1964 campaign. Even though Crane portrayed himself as a 
grassroots candidate, he had extensive campaign experience. He used that experience to 
rally other conservatives together after his election to the house, and further demonstrate 
the lasting impact of conservative suburban insiders from the Goldwater campaign on a 
national level. These three stories reveal that the suburban Goldwater campaign was able 
to change personal ideology, local politics, and national party platforms.   
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Thesis Conclusion: 
All three of the chapters in this thesis contribute to a larger argument: The 
Goldwater primary campaign was created and supported by experienced operatives who 
left a complicated legacy at multiple levels of government. The first chapter explores the 
careers of White, Ashbrook, and Rusher, among others, and compares the reasons for 
their success to the failures of conservative insurgencies before them. Their ability to 
create an experienced, conservative network of campaign operatives was the watershed 
moment that gave conservatives more influence in the 1964 Republican Primary.  In the 
rest of the thesis, I chose to narrow that argument by exploring the history of Goldwater 
campaign operatives through the lens of suburban Illinois. Chapter 2 was a case study on 
the operatives and delegates who composed the leadership of the campaign and why they 
were successful in winning the Illinois primary. This led to the conclusion that the 
campaign was spearheaded by a coalition of suburban professionals and upper-middle-
class women who all shared extensive political experience. The contrast between the 
results of the Illinois and New Hampshire campaigns showed that experienced in-state 
operatives were crucial to the victory of the Illinois Goldwater campaign, which 
previously had failed in their reliance on purely grassroots campaigners in New 
Hampshire. The third chapter continues the study of the suburban campaign but shifts 
subject to the legacy of that campaign. Lucinda Wanner and her daughter, Lucinda 
Kasperson, illustrate the lasting municipal level legacy in suburban DuPage and Lake 
Counties. The career of William Rentschler provides insight into the differing types of 
ideology that the campaign left behind. Rentschler considered himself to carrying on the 
work of the Goldwater campaign by attacking the leadership of the Republican Party. His 
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attacks became increasingly liberal as the party moved further to the right. Fighting 
machine-style politics was the value that Rentschler found in the Goldwater campaign, 
rather than any specific ideology. Finally, Phil Crane's career demonstrates the lasting 
national influence of the campaign and the transformation of conservative operatives. 
Crane began his career as a self-described outsider from a suburban congressional district 
whose campaign experience ran much deeper than he let on. By being a founder of the 
Republican Study Committee, Crane pushed the party to more conservative stances for 
two decades. By the 1990s, Crane himself was no longer prominent in conservative 
leadership, as he became established and mainstream by the new ideological standards of 
the party.  
  This thesis adds a new perspective to the historical analysis previously done on 
the Goldwater Campaign. By traveling to the Goldwater archives at Arizona State 
University and consulting over a dozen newspapers, I was able to create the most detailed 
analysis of the Illinois Goldwater primary campaign to date. I used various sources that 
were either rarely used or never used before, such as the Clif White oral history, the Doug 
Gunkel delegate profiles, small suburban newspaper articles, and various other primary 
documents. The use of these documents led to the conclusion that experienced suburban 
operatives were critical to the creation, success, and legacy of the Goldwater primary 
campaign in Illinois. This research fits within the scope of current academic work by Lisa 
McGirr and Kim Phillips-Fein by acknowledging both the importance of the suburban 
campaigns and of experienced operatives in the 1964 election. This thesis can be used for 
future research into the topic, and hopefully will serve as an inspiration for case studies 
into similar primary campaigns in different states. Future research should find more cases 
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of municipal and national conservative politicians that were inspired by the various 
suburban campaigns in 1964.  
 
 
  
 65 
 
Bibliography 
Primary Sources:  
 
Archival Sources: 
The Personal and Political Paper of Barry M. Goldwater Hayden Library, Arizona State 
University Archives, Tempe, Arizona 
Series II “1964 Campaign” Boxes 119, 122, 139 
Series IV “Personal”, Box 4 
 
Books:  
Schlafly, Phyllis. 1964. A choice, Not an Echo. Alton, Ill: Pere Marquette Press. 
 
White, Theodore H. The Making of the President 1964, New York: Harper Perennial 
Political Classics, 1965. 
 
White, F. Clifton The Goldwater Presidential Nomination: The Reminiscences of F. 
Clifton White, Oral History Office, Columbia University, New York, NY: Columbia 
University, 1965. 
 
Newspapers (accessed using the Newspaper.com database) : 
Alton Evening Telegraph 
Bensenville Register 
Chicago Daily Herald 
Chicago Tribune 
Herald and Review 
Marengo Republican 
Moline Dispatch 
Nashua Telegraph 
New York Times 
New Yorker 
Portsmouth Herald 
Princeton Newsletter 
Roselle Register 
Streator Times 
The Telegraph 
Washington Times 
 
Secondary Sources: 
 
Books: 
Edwards, Lee. Goldwater The Man Who Made a Revolution, Washington: Regnery 
Publishing, 1995. 
 
Frisk, David B. If Not Us, Who?: William Rusher, National Review, and the Conservative 
Movement, Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2012. 
 66 
 
 
Perlstein, Rick. Before the Storm: Barry Goldwater and the Unmaking of the American 
Consensus. New York : Nation Books, 2009. 
 
Martis, Kenneth C., Ruth Anderson. Rowles and Gyula Pauer. The Historical Atlas of 
Political Parties in the United States Congress: 1789-1988. New York, NY: Macmillan 
Pub., 1989. 
 
McGirr, Lisa. Suburban Warriors, Princeton University Press, 2002. 
 
Phillips-Fein, Kim. Invisible Hands: the Businessmans Crusade against the New Deal. 
(New York, NY: Norton, 2010), p.30-60. 
 
Rusher, William A. The Rise of the Right. New York: William Morrow and Co., 1984. 
 
 
. 
 
 
 
